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Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.: Tender
Off eror's Right to Injunctive Relief
Recognized
I. Introduction
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,' decided by the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1981, represents one thread in the legal
tangle2 created by Mobil's unsuccessful takeover bid for Mara-
thon.3 When Mobil announced its offer to purchase a controlling
interest of Marathon common stock, Marathon engaged in vari-
ous defensive tactics to defeat the takeover bid. These tactics
included an antitrust suit against Mobil" and negotiations with a
company regarded as a more attractive candidate for merger 5 -
United States Steel, Inc. (USS, Inc.), a newly formed subsidiary
of United States Steel Corp. (USS). 6
Mobil brought the present suit against Marathon and USS,
Inc. to enjoin them from carrying out their proposed merger.7
1. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter appellant will be referred to as Mobil
and appellee will be referred to as Marathon].
2. For a summary presentation of the cases involving the contest for control of Mar-
athon, see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,375, at 92,263 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
3. Marathon Oil Co. is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
Findlay, Ohio. Mobil Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in New York, New York. Both companies are among the seventeen major integrated
petroleum companies in the United States. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F.
Supp. 315, 317 (N.D. Ohio), alf'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1490 (1982).
4. Id.
5. Such a candidate is commonly referred to as a "white knight."
6. USS, Inc. is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corp.
which is a Delaware corporation. USS, Inc. was incorporated in Ohio on November 18,
1981, the same day it entered into three agreements with Marathon. Mobil Corp. v. Mar-
athon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,375, at 92,263. See
infra text accompanying notes 18-20.
7. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) V 98,375, at 92,263. The district court denied Mobil's motion for a preliminary
injunction and Mobil appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Mobil claimed, inter alia,s that the defendants violated the Wil-
liams Act9 in their filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and in their communications with the Mara-
thon shareholders, by not disclosing material facts relevant to
the announced USS, Inc. tender offer 0 and the negotiated agree-
ments between the defendants." The district court dissolved a
previously granted temporary restraining order and denied Mo-
bil's application for a preliminary injunction"2 and Mobil
appealed. 3
The Sixth Circuit held that Mobil had standing to sue for
injunctive relief as tender offeror" and that some of Marathon's
8. Mobil also claimed that the directors of Marathon violated state-imposed fiduci-
ary duties to the company and its shareholders, violated state law by agreeing to dispose
of corporate assets without shareholder approval and by acting beyond the scope of their
authority in approving the stock option and Yates Field option. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Co., Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,375, at 92,263-64.
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solici-
tation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation.
Id. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the Williams
Act.
10. USS, Inc. publicly announced its offer for 30 million shares of Marathon com-
mon stock at $125 per share net to the seller on November 19, 1981, one day after enter-
ing into the merger agreement with Marathon. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,375, at 92,269.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 18-20 for a discussion of the agreements be-
tween USS, Inc. and Marathon.
12. Mobil Corp. v. Marthon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE.
(CCH) 1 98,375, at 92,286.
13. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
14. Mobil held a small percentage of Marathon common stock prior to the at-
tempted acquisition. The court declined to recognize Mobil's status as a shareholder,
giving it standing as a tender offeror only. The court reasoned that Mobil was acting
primarily as a hostile tender offeror, and as such, did not need the information to make a
decision on whether to accept their own offer. Id. at 370.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court assumed
this position when Chris-Craft asserted their standing under section 14(e) as a share-
holder as well as a tender offeror. The Court wrote:
It is clear. . . that Chris-Craft has not asserted standing under § 14(e) as a Piper
shareholder. The reason is not hard to devine. As a tender offeror actively engaged
in competing for Piper stock, Chris-Craft was not in the posture of a target share-
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/16
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defensive tactics were in violation of the Williams Act."5 The is-
sue of whether a tender offeror had standing to sue for injunc-
tive relief under these circumstances was one of first impression
for the Sixth Circuit. This Note will analyze the court's treat-
ment of that issue and discuss the effects of its holding.
II. Facts
The legal actions surrounding the merger battle ensued
upon Mobil's announced offer on November 1, 1981 to purchase
up to 40 million shares of Marathon common stock at $85 cash
per share net to the seller.1 On November 1, 1981, Marathon
filed a motion for and was granted a preliminary injunction en-
joining Mobil from carrying out the proposed acquisition on the
basis that a merger of the two companies would likely be found
later to violate antitrust law.1 7 On November 18, 1981, Marathon
entered into three agreements with USS, Inc.: 1) a merger agree-
ment whereby USS, Inc. would be merged into Marathon with
Marathon becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of USS;18 2) a
stock option agreement granting USS, Inc. an irrevocable option
to purchase up to 10 million shares of Marathon common stock
holder confronted with the decision of whether to tender or retain its stock. Con-
sequently, Chris-Craft could scarcely have alleged a need for disclosures mandated
by the Williams Act. In short, the fact that Chris-Craft necessarily acquired Piper
stock as a means of taking over Piper adds nothing to its § 14(e) standing
arguments.
Id. at 35-36.
15. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 375. The court focused on the
manipulative aspect of section 14(e) in analyzing the options granted to USS, Inc. by
Marathon. Although "manipulative" is not defined, the court looked to two recent Su-
preme Court cases, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 424 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) and Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) to characterize manipulative acts as those
which artificially affect and completely block normal market activity. Id. at 374.
16. Id. at 367. Mobil conditioned the purchase on receipt of at least 30 million
shares, which represented at least half of Marathon's outstanding stock. In addition, Mo-
bil intended to acquire the remaining Marathon assets by a merger of the two corpora-
tions after the purchase of those shares. Id.
17. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 326 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 669
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982). Marathon demonstrated
that the combined market shares of Mobil and Marathon in several states would proba-
bly lessen competition in those states in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Id.
18. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,375, at 92,263, 92,268-269. See supra note 6.
19831
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at $90 per share; s 3) the Yates Field option agreement granting
USS, Inc. an option to purchase Marathon's interest in Yates
Field for $2.8 billion if the USS, Inc. offer did not succeed and if
a third party gained control of Marathon.20 On November 19,
1981, USS, Inc. announced its tender offer 21 and on November
24, 1981, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio issued a temporary restraining order, upon the ap-
plication of Mobil, restraining USS, Inc. and Marathon from
taking any action in connection with the Yates Field option or
the USS, Inc. tender offer.22 On the following day, November 25,
1981, Mobil announced a second tender offer for 30 million com-
mon shares of Marathon at $126 per share,23 upon condition that
the stock option and Yates Field option agreements be cancelled
or held invalid by court order.24 Thereafter, on December 7,
1981, the district court dissolved the temporary restraining order
and denied Mobil's application for a preliminary injunction.2 5
Mobil appealed this decision, as well as the district court's ear-
lier grant of a preliminary injunction on the antitrust grounds in
19. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,375, at 92,263, 92,270.
20. Id. at 92,263, 92,273-274. The Yates Field has been described as "[o]ne of the
world's most remarkable oil fields," id. at 92,273 (quotation omitted), although petro-
leum engineers consider the field to be in the intermediate state of depletion, id. (cita-
tion omitted). Marathon's interest in Yates Field was a principal reason several compa-
nies sought acquisition of Marathon, e.g., Gulf Oil and Allied Industries. Id. at 92,267-
268.
21. The terms of USS, Inc.'s tender offer were disclosed to the Marathon sharehold-
ers in a letter prepared and mailed by the Marathon Board. The terms of the offer were
that USS, Inc. was to purchase up to 30 million Marathon common shares (about 50% of
the outstanding shares) at $125 per share, USS, Inc. would merge into Marathon, and
the shareholders who did not receive $125 in cash for their shares would receive $100
principal amount of USS, Inc. 12 year 121/2 % notes for each share of Marathon stock. Id.
at 92,272.
22. Id. at 92,275.
23. Marathon brought an antitrust suit after Mobil's first tender offer, supra note 3;
the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio issued a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Mobil from purchasing any Marathon shares but allowed Mobil to continue
to receive tenders. Mobil went forward with the second offer with these conditions still
imposed. Id. at 92,266.
24. Id. at 92,275.
25. The court wrote that "Mobil has failed to demonstrate a strong or substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the defendants have violated section
14(e) of the Williams Act." Id. at 92,285.
26. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/16
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favor of Marathon.
In separate decisions, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the injunction against Mobil on antitrust grounds28 and
reversed the decision denying Mobil's prayer for injunctive re-
lief.2 9 These decisions permitted Mobil's tender offer to remain
in effect and barred USS, Inc. from exercising the Yates option.
III. Legal Background
The Williams Act of 196830 was enacted as an amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' and comprises sections
13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) of that Act. It supplements federal regu-
lation of corporate acquisitions by creating disclosure require-
ments and prohibiting certain practices in connection with
tender offers. The statute is widely accepted as one which pro-
tects shareholder rights.3 Former Senator Harrison Williams,
sponsor of the Act, wrote that "Congress first amended the se-
curities laws in 1968 expressly to recognize and provide for basic
investor protections in tender offer situations. . .."3-
The Williams Act does not provide for private rights of ac-
tion. 4 Courts have recognized that in order to effectuate the
goals of the Act, private causes of action should be implied
27. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981).
28. Id.
29. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 366.
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
32. For a general discussion of the Williams Act, see E. ARAjow, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1973) and E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN
& G. BERLST IN, DEVELOPMmENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977)
[hereinafter referred to as ARANOW]. For a discussion of the Act as it relates to the stand-
ing issue, see generally Note, Tender Offers: Standing To Sue, Prohibited Practices, Re-
liance of Non-Tenderers, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 930 (1980); The Uncertain Evolution
Of Private Actions Under The Williams Act, 3 J. CORP. L. 364 (1978); Note, Tender
Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under The Williams Act, 45 FORDHAM L. REv.
51 (1976).
33. ARANOW, supra note 32, at Introduction.
34. Express provisions for private causes of action in other sections of the Exchange
Act are found at: § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b); § 18(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78(t). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
572 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975); National
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359
U.S. 464, 471 (1959).
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under the Act in favor of those sought to be protected, namely,
shareholders; 5 some courts have also granted standing to target
corporations.36 Since tender offerors were not intended as the
principal parties to be protected under the statute, 7 private
causes of action are not as readily implied for them.
A. Implying Private Causes of Action
The J.I. Case Co. v. Borak38 decision marked the beginning
of the Supreme Court's recognition of private causes of action
under the Exchange Act. In Borak, the Court faced the issue of
whether shareholders of a merged corporation had standing to
assert resolutions of the proxy disclosure requirements of section
14(a) of the Act.3 9 The Court viewed the section as designed "to
35. See, e.g., Lowenchuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975); Broder v. Dane, 384
F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). For a general discussion of tender offer litigation, see ARANOW, supra note 32, at
104-05.
36. See, e.g., Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (target company with standing to sue for declaratory and injunctive relief
under the Williams Act); H.K. Pocter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir.
1973) (target company with standing to sue for damages under section 14(e) of Williams
Act); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969) (target company with standing to seek injunctive relief under section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act). But see Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92
(N.D. Il. 1980), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1871 (7th Cir. Aug. 11, 1980).
37. Former Senator Harrison Williams said of the Williams Act that "[wie have
taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor
of the person making the takeover bids. Section 510 is designed solely to require full and
fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." H.R. 17-11, 90th Cong., 1st Seas., 113 CONG.
REc. 24,664 (1967).
38. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an ex-
empted security) registered on any national securities exchange in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
The plaintiffs attempted to bring their claim to enforce section 14(a) under § 27 of the
Act. Section 27 provides in part:
The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/16
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prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure
in proxy solicitation . , "40 and furthermore, "for the protec-
tion of investors." '41 Additionally, private enforcement of the
proxy rules was deemed to be an important supplement to the
SEC's own enforcement actions.42 The Court thus held that pri-
vate causes of action be implied to effectuate the Congressional
purpose, namely, the protection of the investors.43
Eleven years later the Court elaborated its Borak holding.
In Cort v. Ash," the Court established the determinative factors
for deciding whether a private cause of action should be implied
from a statute not expressly creating one. In Cort, a shareholder
of Bethlehem Steel Corp. sought damages and injunctive relief
to prevent management from making campaign contributions to
the 1972 presidential elections. The contributions allegedly vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. § 610, a criminal statute which prohibits "corpo-
rations from contributions or expenditures in connection with
specified federal elections.""" The Court, in holding that no im-
plied cause of action could be maintained by the shareholder"
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the
rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
40. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
41. Id. at 432.
42. Id. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). See also SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102 (1980) (SEC injunctive ac-
tion under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)).
43. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33.
44. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
45. Section 610 provided in part:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by author-
ity of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office,
or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution
or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to ac-
cept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1970).
46. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 85.
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reasoned that neither the congressional purpose 47 nor the Act it-
self4 contemplated enforcement of the statute by shareholders
of the corporate violators. The Court articulated four factors
which consider:
1. whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial bene-
fit the statute was enacted;
2. whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one;
3. whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff;
4. whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to
state law.'
Since Cort, courts"0 have relied in varying degrees on these four
factors to determine whether private causes of action can be im-
plied to enforce sections 13 and 14 of the Williams Act.
B. Limiting Private Causes of Action
In 1979, the Supreme Court began to limit implied private
actions under the securities laws. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington5 and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,52
the Court declined to imply private causes of action under sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act5" and section 206 of
47. The Court wrote: "The legislation was primarily concerned with corporations as
a source of. . .possible corrupting influence, and not directly with the internal relations
between the corporations and their stockholders." Id. at 82. "[I]n this instance the rem-
edy sought would not aid the primary congressional goal." Id. at 84.
48. The Court wrote: "[T]here is no indication whatever in the legislative history of
§ 610 which suggests a congressional intention to vest in corporate shareholders a federal
right to damages for violations of § 610." Id. at 82.
49. Id. at 78.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 61, 69-71, 78-84, 93, 118, 125.
51. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
52. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
53. In 1972, section 17(a), as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970 ed.) read as
follows:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such
member, every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer regis-
tered pursuant to section 78q of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such
periods, such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other
records, and make such reports as the Commission by its rules and regulations
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors. Such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/16
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the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 5" respectively.
In Touche Ross, the trustee of a liquidated securities
brokerage firm55 attempted to hold the accounting firm, Touche
Ross, liable for damages for an allegedly improper audit of the
brokerage firm's financial condition. The trustee asserted that
Touche Ross violated section 17(a)5 e of the Exchange Act which
other records shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable
periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representatives of
the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Section 17 of the 1934 Act was substantially amended by the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975. § 14, 89 Stat. 137. The present § 17(a)(1) contains essentially the same
language as the first sentence of the 1972 version of § 17(a). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)
(1970 ed.) with 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (1976 ed.).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospec-
tive client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or
purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the ac-
count of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the comple-
tion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the con-
sent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this pargraph shall not
apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or
dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this para-
graph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Id.
55. Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis) was a securities brokerage firm registered as a bro-
ker dealer with the SEC and a member of the New York Stock Exchange. In 1973, the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a nonprofit organization of securities
dealers established by Congress, learned of Weis' unstable financial position. The SIPC
petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
appoint a trustee to protect the assets of Weis' customers.
During the subsequent liquidation of Weis, the assets appeared to be insufficient to
cover all the claims and the trustee, along with the SIPC, sued Touche Ross for damages
arising from their allegedly improper audit and certification. The trustee alleged that if a
proper audit had been conducted, the true position of Weis would have been discovered
earlier and less adverse financial consequences would have taken place. Touche Ross &
Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 565-66.
56. Id. at 566.
19831
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requires broker-dealers to keep records and file reports with the
SEC. 57 The Supreme Court noted that the section simply re-
quired proper record keeping and filing5" and that Congress did
not intend a private cause of action for anyone.59 The Court also
declined to give such effect to Borak6" and Cort6 l whereby "vir-
tually every provision of the Securities Act gives rise to an im-
plied cause of action. ' 62  The Court instead wrote that "[t]he
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, ei-
ther expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." 3
In Transamerica, the Court implied a cause of action in
favor of a shareholder of a mortgage investment trust 4 under
57. Id. at 562.
58. Id. at 569.
59. Id. The Court wrote that there was an express cause of action against profes-
sionals, inclusive of accountants, under section 18(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78r(a) (1976).
60. The Court wrote that in Borak, "a private cause of action was implicit in §
14(a). We do not now question the actual holding of that case, but we decline to read the
opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of the Securities Acts gives rise to an
implied private cause of action." Id. at 577 (citations omitted).
61. In regards to the SIPC and the trustee's reliance on Cort, and its rationale of
using private causes of action to effectuate the purpose of the legislation, the Court "be-
lieve[d] such inquiries [had] little relevance to the decision of [the] case. It is true that
in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered 'relevant' in determin-
ing whether a private remedy [was] implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But
the Court did not decide that each of these factors [was] entitled to equal weight." Id. at
575.
62. Id. at 577.
63. Id. at 575.
64. The plaintiff, a shareholder of Mortgage Trust of Am. (Trust), sued Trust, sev-
eral trustees, Trust's investment advisor (Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.)
(TAMA) and several affiliated corporations. In three causes of action the plaintiff al-
leged, inter alia, that the advisory contract between the Trust and TAMA was unlawful
because both parties were not registered under the Investment Act and that the compen-
sation was grossly excessive, that TAMA breached its fiduciary duty to the Trust by
causing the Trust to purchase inferior securities, and that TAMA misappropriated profit
investment opportunities for the benefit of the affiliated corporations. Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 13. The complainant shareholders sought
injunctive relief preventing performance of the contract, rescission of the contract, resti-
tution of fees (all provided for under § 215 of the Investment Act) and for award of
damages (§ 206 was used as a basis for asserting damages).
In its discussion of the plaintiff's claims under section 215 the Court wrote: "[W]hen
Congress declared in "§ 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the custom-
ary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for rescis-
sion or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitu-
tion." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/16
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section 215 of the Investment Act,6" which provides that con-
tracts whose formation or performance would violate the Act
shall be void.s" The Court refused, however, to imply a cause of
action under section 206,67 the general antifraud provision of the
Act, analogous to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.66 In reach-
ing these dissimilar results, the Court narrowly read Cort and
Borak and reasoned that no private cause of action could be im-
plied where it is clear that Congress did not intend to create
such a remedy. 9 Hence, as to section 215, the Court found that
the plaintiff shareholder was intended to be protected by that
section and could sue for injunctive relief thereunder. 70 As to
plaintiff's action for damages under section 206, the Court deter-
mined that Congress was "unwilling to impose any potential
monetary liability on a private suitor."' 7' The Court's rationale,
in Transamerica, as well as in Touche Ross, apparently centers
on whether Congress intended a particular party to have an im-
plied cause of action. The four factors of Cort may be illustra-
tive of whether Congress intended to imply a private cause of
action, but are certainly not determinative.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 806-15 (1976).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) provides in part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and
every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves
the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of
any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall
be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provi-
sion, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a
party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual
knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such
contract was in violation of any such provision.
Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). See supra note 54.
68. In his dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens, wrote: "The provisions of § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6, are substantially similar to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(h) (1976), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979) both of
which have been held to create private rights of action for which damages may be recov-
ered." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 25 n.1 (White, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 23-24.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 21.
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C. Tender Offerors and Implied Private Causes of Action
1. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.
Prior to 1977, it was clear that tender offerors had standing
to sue under the Williams Act.72 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc., s however, the Supreme Court denied standing to a
tender offeror seeking relief under section 14(e) of the Williams
Act. In that case, Chris-Craft, a manufacturer of recreational
products, attempted to obtain control of Piper,7 a family con-
trolled manufacturer of light aircraft. The Piper family resisted,
and ultimately foiled Chris-Craft's takeover attempt, by assist-
ing a third company, Bangor Punta, in obtaining 50 percent of
the outstanding stock of Piper.7 5 Chris-Craft brought suit
against Piper and Bangor Punta, seeking damages for alleged
disclosure violations. The Supreme Court excluded tender offer-
ors as benefitted parties under the Williams Act and thus denied
Chris-Craft damages.
The Supreme Court based its decision in part on a narrow
reading of the Williams Act and its legislative history, in stating:
[T]here is, as we have noted, no indication that Congress in-
tended to create a damages remedy in favor of the loser in a con-
test for control. Fairly read, we think the legislative documents
evince the narrow intent to curb the unregulated activities of
tendor offerors. The expression of this purpose, which pervades
the legislative history, negates the claim that tender offerors were
72. See Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 695-
96 (2d Cir. 1975); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Corgill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 871 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); GAF Corp. V. Milsteen, 453 F.2d 709, 719-20 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 944-46 (2d Cir. 1969); Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 411 F.
Supp. 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Applied Digital Data Systems Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425
F. Supp. 1145, 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
73. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court and
was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens dissented and was joined by Jus-
tice Brennan.
74. Chris-Craft began its bid by purchasing 13% of Piper's common stock on the
open market, then publicly announced a cash tender offer for approximately one fifth of
Piper's common stock. The offer was $12 over the market price. Id. at 5.
75. Piper approached Bangor Punta with an exchange offer of 31% of Piper's stock
for the same number of shares of Bangor Punta stock. Piper secured Bangor Punta's
promise to obtain as many outstanding shares of Piper stock as possible. These subse-
quent purchases effectively barred Chris-Craft's takeover bid. Id. at 6.
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intended to have additional weapons in the form of an implied
cause of action for damages, particularly if a private damages ac-
tion confers no advantage on the expressly protected class of
shareholder-offerees ...."
Furthermore, the Court found "no hint in the legislative history,
on which respondent so heavily relies, that Congress contem-
plated a private cause of action for damages by one of several
contending offerors against a successful bidder or by a losing
contender against the target corporation.
7 7
The Court supported its interpretation of the Williams Act
by using its analysis in Cort v. Ash .7 The majority in Piper de-
clined to recognize Chris-Craft as a party for whose benefit the
statute was enacted.79 Indeed, the Court remarked that the stat-
ute was enacted to regulate parties such as Chris-Craft - "to
curb the unregulated activities of tender offerors.''80 Thus, the
Court determined that there was no legislative intent to create a
private cause of action for tender offerors, 81 and that implying
one would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute.82 Finally, the Court noted that it would be appropriate
to relegate Chris-Craft to its remedy under the state law.8 3 Chief
Justice Burger left open the question "whether as a general
proposition a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished
from an action in damages, would lie in favor of a tender offeror
under either §14(e) or Rule lOb-6."84
Mr. Justice Stevens, in a strenuous dissent, viewed tender
offerors as having standing under section 14(e) 85 as provided by
76. Id. at 38. The Court stated: "[W]e hold only that a tender offeror, suing in its
capacity as a takeover bidder, does not have standing to sue for damages under § 14(e)."
Yd. at 42 n.28.
77. Id. at 42. The Court stated: "[S]hareholder protection, if enhanced at all by
damages awards as Chris-Craft contends for, can be more directly achieved with other,
less drastic means more closely tailored to the precise congressional goal underlying the
Williams Act." Id. at 40.
78. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
79. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 37.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 40-41.
84. Id. at 47 n.33.
85. Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1983]
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J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.s6 Regarding the shareholder's implied
private cause of action to enforce the proxy statement disclosure
requirements, Justice Stevens noted that "[s]uch a remedy was
regarded as essential for the protection of investors because
practical considerations made it impossible for the SEC to en-
force the . . . proxy requirements completely and effectively.
This practical concern applies with even greater force to tender
offers which are processed on a highly expedited schedule."8
The Borak decision also provided support for Justice Stevens'
position that tender offerors should be able to enforce section
14(e).88 Assuming private rights of action could be implied to
ensure full compliance with the statute, argued Justice Stevens,
then "the remedy must be available to the litigants who are
most vitally interested in effective enforcement."8 9
The Piper dissent further focused on practical considera-
tions in deciding that tender offerors should have standing to
sue for damages. Tender offerors have the most to gain from en-
forcement of the statute, and the most to lose if the disclosure
requirements are not met.90 Also, the tender offerors are in the
best position to detect any prohibited conduct.9 " The tender of-
ferors, as well, are the best suited to litigate the case.2
Justice Stevens' considerable reliance on Borak and a con-
cern for practical considerations obviated the necessity of rely-
ing on Cort9 s to imply a cause of action under the statute. In
Borak and Piper, reasoned Justice Stevens, there was "at least a
statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some
sort lay in favor of someone" 4 and, furthermore, a failure to im-
ply a tender offeror's private action would hinder the congres-
sional purpose.98 Justice Stevens concluded that that the four-
86. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
87. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
433 (1964)).
89. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying note 194.
93. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
94. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 66 (Stevens J., dissenting) (quoting
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79).
95. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 85).
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part Cort test"6 need not be addressed in depth because of the
absence of the aforementioned factors7
2. Post Piper
Soon after Piper, and before Touche Ross9" and Reding-
ton,99 two lower federal courts granted tender offerors standing
to sue for injunctive relief under the Williams Act. In Humana,
Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc.,'00 a thwarted tender offeror
seeking injunctive relief against a target corporation for alleged
material misrepresentations under section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act, '0 attempted to join the competing tender offerors in the
action.102 Humana alleged that the competing tender offerors vi-
olated the section 14(e) disclosure requirements by supplying in-
complete information on their own management and its tender
offer.10 3 The issue faced by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York was "whether, in light of Piper, and offeror
(Humana) has standing to sue a competing offeror .. .for in-
junctive relief.' 0 4 The court resolved the issue in favor of
Humana,10 5 finding support in the Supreme Court's reservation
in Piper concerning injunctive relief. 06 The court thus reasoned
that: where shareholder protection can be achieved by less dras-
tic means than damages, a private action for injunctive relief
would be proper.10 7 The exigency of the situation, 08 the nature
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79, 84-85).
97. Id. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
99. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
100. 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
101. See supra note 9.
102. The competing tender offerors were Trans World Airways and its wholly owned
subsidiary Hilton International Co. The Court, in addressing the procedural background,
wrote:
Humana moved by Order to show cause to file a second amended and supplemen-
tal complaint to its action against Medicorp and to all [the competing tender of-
ferors] as defendants; to state new causes of action relating to the [other tender
offerors] conipetitive offer; and to request injunctive relief against [the compelling
tender offerors].
Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. at 614.
103. Id. at 616.
104. Id. at 614.
105. Id. at 616.
106. Id. at 615. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
107. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. at 615. The court
1983]
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of the relief sought, 109 and the benefit to be derived by full dis-
closure to the shareholders,' 10 led the court in Humana to recog-
nize a tender offeror's implied cause of action under section
14(e).111
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
similarly restricted Piper to a tender offeror's action for dam-
ages. In Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American
Dredging Co.," 2 the court held that the tender offeror (Weeks)
had standing to seek injunctive relief against the target company
(American) under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act. 3 The
Weeks court reasoned that the "Supreme Court in Piper recog-
nized the beneficial effects [of injunctive relief] when it said that
'in corporate control contests the stage of preliminary injunctive
relief, rather than post contest lawsuits is the time when relief
can best be given.' "114 Moreover, the court simply chose to rec-
ognize the tender offeror's standing "for the reasons stated in
the Humana decision,"' 15 though it chose not to expand on any
particular theme.
In 1981, a third district court granted standing to a tender
offeror seeking to enjoin a target corporation from purchasing its
own stock as a defensive maneuver. In Crane Co. v. Harsco
wrote: "No remedy can be more 'closely tailored' to the needs of [tender offer situations]
than injunctive relief, when appropriate. The very purpose of injunctive relief is to afford
a remedy precisely contoured to the requirements of the situations." Id.
108. Humana's offer was set to expire 13 days after the district court opinion was
rendered.
109. See supra note 107.
110. The court wrote: "In sum, the thrust of the complaint is to request increased
disclosure of the terms of the [competing] offer and the character of the [competing]
management so that Medicorp. stockholders may more intelligently choose between...
Humana and [the competing] offers." Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F.
Supp. at 616.
111. Id. at 615.
112. 451 Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
113. Weeks alleged that material representations and omissions 6ccurred when re-
marks made by the President of American Dredging Co. appeared in a financial newspa-
per. The remarks, said to violate section 14(e), concerned the valuation of American
stock and the financial condition of the corporation. Id. at 471-72.
114. Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. at
476 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 42).
115. Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. at
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Corp.,"' the court first addressed the question of whether the
tender offeror had standing to assert its claims. ' To answer in
the affirmative, as the court did, it was necessary to distinguish
the Piper decision and to satisfy the four-part Cort test.11 8 The
court also had to overcome the limitations placed on implying
causes of action by the Touche Ross and Transamerica cases.119
The court in Crane distinguished Piper by paralleling the
approaches adopted in Humana 1 ° and Weeks:121 the injunctive
nature of the relief sought by the tender offeror neutralizes the
concerns of the majority in Piper.12 The court noted that the
additional disclosure compelled by the injunctive nature of the
action would aid the shareholders to make informed decisions.12 3
It further noted that damages do not aid in disclosure, but
rather impede tender offerors and penalize shareholders.' 2"
The protection of the shareholders led to the Crane court's
determination that the four Cort factors did not preclude a
tender offeror from being denied a private cause of action. 25
Rather than apply the four factors (class benefit, legislative in-
tent, consistency with the legislative scheme, and whether the
cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law) to the sec-
tion at issue, 13(e), the court applied the factors to the Williams
116. 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981).
117. Crane commenced a tender offer for 15% of the outstanding Harsco stock. The
Delaware District Court denied Harsco's motion to enjoin the offer on violations of fed-
eral securities laws and on antitrust grounds. Crane then moved to prevent Harsco from
purchasing 15% of its outstanding shares, alleging a violation of section 13(e) of the
Williams Act. The court granted a temporary restraining order, ultimately denying
Crane's prayer for injunctive relief. Id. at 297. The court held that Crane, the tender
offeror, failed to establish sufficient grounds to justify an injunction under section 13(e)
of the Exchange Act. Id. at 306.
118. See supra text accompanying note 49.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 51-71.
120. 445 F. Supp. 613.
121. 451 F. Supp. 468.
122. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. at 299-300 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 42).
123. The court wrote: "Crane itself would not directly benefit from injunctive relief;
rather, the shareholders would be protected from management's manipulative or fraudu-
lent actions which would otherwise nullify the informational advantages granted by the
Act. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. at 300.
124. The court wrote: "[Diamage awards to parties other than the protected class of
shareholders would not serve to insure disclosure and might even impede attractive
tender offers." Id.
125. Id.
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Act in general to determine if a tender offeror has standing. "
With this broad approach, the court had little trouble satisfying
the second, third, and fourth factors. 2 7 As to the first, however,
the Crane court adopted a pragmatic approach. Realizing that
the tender offeror was not the intended beneficiary, the court
circumvented this requirement by asserting that the sharehold-
ers, as the intended beneficiaries, would indeed by benefitted if
the tender offerors would be allowed to assert the claims of mis-
representation and nondisclosure.128 The court perceived the
tender offeror as possessing the "timely knowledge of misrepre-
sentations and thus the practical opportunity to enforce" the
provisions of the Williams Act. 2 9
V. Decision of the Court
A. Majority Opinion
The Mobil court first analyzed whether Piper prevented de-
feated tender offerors from seeking relief." The court observed
that although in Piper a defeated tender offeror could not main-
tain a cause of action for damages, the Supreme Court did not
rule on the availability of private causes of action for injunctive
relief.'13  The Supreme Court's express reservation of "whether
as a general proposition a suit in equity for injunctive relief...
would lie in favor of a tender offeror under . . . section 14(e),' ' s
in fact provided the Mobil court the opportunity to look beyond
the limitations of Piper'33 and determine whether a private
126. Section 13(e) was only discussed in the context of the fourth requirement:
whether the cause of action is relegated to state law. Id. at 301. This factor, however, is
least important. All four factors should have been analyzed to determine whether a pri-
vate cause of action can be implied under section 13(e).
127. 511 F. Supp. at 300-01.
128. Id. at 300. This practical view of tender offer situations is shared by the noted
commentators, Messrs. Aranow, Einhorn and Berlstein who stated that it "is essential to
ensure that shareholders receive complete and accurate information concerning tender
offers from the management of the target as well as from the offeror." ARANOW, supra
note 32, at 110.
129. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. at 300.
130. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 370.
131. Id. (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 47). See discussion of
Piper, supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
132. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 47 n.33.
133. See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. at 614.
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cause of action for injunctive relief could be implied for a frus-
trated tender offeror. In making such a determination, the ma-
jority relied primarily on the Cort v. Ash 13 4 decision.
The first of the four Cort factors applied by the Mobil ma-
jority was "whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted."'' 35 The court, without
hesitation, decided that Mobil did not meet this criterion.' As
a tender offeror, Mobil was not an intended beneficiary of the
Williams Act. The court, however, reasoned that the practical
purpose of the first Cort factor is ultimately to benefit the share-
holder: "A preliminary injunction against manipulative practices
would be the only means of preserving the free, informed choice
of shareholders that the Williams Act was designed to pro-
tect.'1 37 Tender offerors are often in the best position to spot
and control manipulative acts prohibited by the Williams Act.'"
Thus, the majority found that Mobil should be allowed to main-
tain a cause of action for injunctive relief for the benefit of the
Marathon shareholders.
The second factor applied by the majority was whether
there exists "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or im-
plicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one."13 9 The
court, at best, could only conclude that injunctive relief was not
inconsistent with the legislative intent, as an action for damages
was.'4 0 The court reasoned that injunctive relief acted to protect
134. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
135. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 371 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 371.
137. Id.
138. The court, in describing the dynamics of a tender offer situation, wrote:
In a tender offer battle, events occur with explosive speed and require immediate
response by a party seeking to enjoin the unlawful conduct. Issues such as incom-
plete disclosure and manipulative practices can only be effectively spotted and
argued by parties with complete knowledge of the target, its business, and others
in the industry. The tender offeror has frequently made intensive investigations
before deciding to commence its offer, and may often be the only party with
enough knowledge and awareness to identify nondisclosure or manipulative prac-
tices in time to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Id.
139. Id. at 372.
140. The Mobil court recognized the Supreme Court's position in Piper that an ac-
tion for damages could not stand because it would be inconsistent with the legislative
intent of the Williams Act. Id.
19831
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shareholders because it "serves merely to prevent the manipula-
tive practices at which the Williams Act was aimed ....'""
Therefore, a cause of action for injunctive relief could be implied
as a means of achieving such protection, and, as such, furthers
the purpose of the Williams Act.
The third factor applied by the court attempted to match
the remedy sought with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme. 4" The majority in Mobil reasoned that injunctive relief
"would protect all Marathon shareholders by preventing man-
agement or competing tender offerors from failing to disclose
fully or from using manipulative tactics. ' 143 The court felt that
injunctive relief would protect the interests of shareholders, pro-
vide full disclosure, and is therefore consistent with the statu-
tory scheme.1 44
The fourth factor applied by the court was whether "the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.' 41
The court concluded that common law has been inadequate to
prevent nondisclosure or manipulation;14 and Ohio law "is by
no means adequate to serve as a substitute for an action under
section 14(e)."' 47 Because the Ohio statute was inadequate, the
court determined that this issue was subject to federal securities
law.148
After concluding that Mobil's suit for injunctive relief was
consistent with both the underlying purpose of the Williams Act
and the Supreme Court decision of Cort v. Ash,'49 the majority
examined whether the Supreme Court's recent constriction on
implying private causes of action under the securities laws af-
fected Mobil's bid for injunctive relief. 50 The Court conceded
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The court wrote: "we are mindful that as a general rule the Supreme Court has
cautioned against the implication of private causes of action under the securities laws
.... .Id.
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that the general rule is to limit private causes of action.15 1 The
special circumstances of the case, reasoned the Court, led to a
conclusion inapposite with such a rule. The circumstances noted
by the Court were: the timeliness of the action (at a relatively
early stage in the takeover bid),' 6 ' the status of the plaintiff
(tender offerors as plaintiffs possess the requisite information to
successfully challenge Williams Act violations), 53 the nature of
the relief sought (injunctive relief is more closely tailored to the
underlying goal of the Williams Act of shareholder protection
than that of damages as sought in Piper)'" and finally, that the
antitrust considerations in the companion case, Marathon Oil
Co. v. Mobil Corp., were still appealable. 65
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Merritt considered all of Marathon's
disclosure violations moot because of the prior disposition of the
antitrust case.'" The dissent reasoned that Mobil's ability to
raise the Williams Act violations rested upon its ability to make
a tender offer for Marathon stock. 5 7 Since Mobil was barred
from making a tender offer due to the antitrust considerations,
it could not argue that Marathon improperly defended against
the offer by manipulative acts. The dissent concluded that the
manipulation question could best be recognized and raised by an
ordinary shareholder or a competing tender offeror'" since "the
interests of the stockholders are not represented" by Mobil.'"
Thus, Judge Merritt argued that the court should not have con-
sidered the standing to sue issue."10
151. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
152. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 373.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 378 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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VI. Analysis
The majority opinion in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. 1'
is the product of a court which has rendered a proper decision
but has been judicially dishonest in its application of the law.
The Mobil court's analysis of whether Mobil had standing under
section 14(e) paralleled the approach adopted by the Piper ma-
jority in form, but not in substance. Both courts examined the
Cort factors1 2 to determine whether a cause of action could be
implied under the statute. The Mobil court, however, applied
the rationale of the Piper dissent1" to the factors discussed by
the Piper majority.'" This strained use of legal precedent illus-
trates the Mobil court's determination to reduce the effect of
Piper on granting tender offerors private causes of action. In-
deed, the court undertook to establish a tender offeror's implied
cause of action on its own initiative - neither party raised the
standing issue at trial.165
In their analyses of the first Cort factor (class of benefi-
ciaries of the statute), both the Mobil majority and Justice Ste-
vens applied a test of practicality."" Although the tender offeror
was not among the intended benefitted class, both reasoned that
the tender offeror was best suited to protect the shareholders'
interests. 1 7 As practical and fair as this seems, the fact remains
that Mobil, as tender offeror, is not in the class contemplated by
161. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
162. See supra text accompanying note 49.
163. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens read the Williams Act as broadly im-
plying a cause of action. He noted that private actions were an effective way of enforcing
the statute and that all parties interested in full disclosure must have such actions avail-
able to them. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 61-62. Additionally, tender
offerors have greater financial and data resources to detect and challenge any Williams
Act violations. Id. at 68. See ARANOW, supra note 32, at 108-10 (better position of tender
offerors to bring suit for injunctive relief evidences congressional intent to allow such
relief).
164. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
165. The court wrote that "although the issue has not been raised by either party,
out of an abundance of caution we believe it necessary to determine whether Mobil has a
private cause of action for injunctive relief under section 14(e) of the Williams Act."
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 370.
166. See Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 371; Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. See supra note 166.
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Congress to benefit from the Williams Act. 68 The legislative his-
tory is clear on the point that neither the tender offeror nor the
target management was meant to benefit from the statute -
only the shareholder. 69 It is undeniable that the shareholders
will benefit from the tender offeror's suit (increased disclosure),
but the tender offeror also derives benefits. In Mobil, the tender
offeror's offer was sustained and the competing tender offeror
was temporarily enjoined. The court made a value judgment
that in order to protect the integrity of the shareholders' deci-
sions tender offerors will be allowed to bring injunctive suits to
enforce the disclosure requirements of section 14(e).17 0 The con-
sequence of such a conclusion vis-a-vis the expanded role of the
tender offeror in takeover situations appears inapposite with the
Piper Court's legislative analysis of the Williams Act. As inter-
preted in Piper, the sponsors of the Williams Act were con-
cerned with not tipping the scales in favor of the tender offeror
or management.17 1 As evidenced by the Mobil decision though,
the tender offeror was able to play the role of the enforcer - a
role traditionally relegated to the SEC17 1 or target
shareholder. 7 3
The narrow issue presented by the first Cort factor, whether
tender offerors can bring a private cause of action for the benefit
of the shareholders even though they are not the intended bene-
ficiary of the statute, proves difficult to reconcile in a logical
manner. Nevertheless, the idea of shareholder protection as a
sufficient justification for permitting tender offerors to pursue
their desired injunctive relief is too compelling to dismiss. In-
deed, the Mobil court wrote:
We believe ... that we can look to the practical realities of this
type of action and determine that a cause of action is necessary to
aid the shareholders of Marathon ..... "
168. See supra note 31.
169. See supra note 37.
170. See supra note 9.
171. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
174. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 371. This concept was used in
Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981), though the Mobil court did
not cite Crane in this regard. For a discussion of Crane, see supra notes 116-29 and
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The Mobil majority further relied on the Stevens' dissent in
analyzing the second Cort factor, congressional intent to create
or deny a remedy. The majority conceded that Congress did not
intend to give tender offerors a private remedy for damages. 17
5
The court asserted, however, that injunctive relief "has signifi-
cantly different effects than a damage action" in that an injunc-
tion ensures full disclosure and prevents manipulative acts.'7 1
The court's assertion that injunctive relief is a suitable rem-
edy here is irrelevant to the necessary inquiry of whether Con-
gress intended to create or deny a remedy. Such an inquiry re-
quires the court to look to the language of the statute and the
legislative history.17 7 The court could have cited the language
which indicates that Congress would, at the very least, have con-
templated a tender offeror's cause of action if it were for the
benefit of the shareholders. 178
By not addressing whether Congress intended to create a
remedy for tender offerors, the Mobil court avoided dealing with
the Touche Ross17 9 & Transamerica"0 decisions. Those cases il-
lustrated that the central inquiry in implying private causes of
action is the existence of congressional intent to create one. 81 If
accompanying text.
175. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 371.
176. The court wrote:
On the other hand, an injunctive action by a tender offeror has significantly
different effects than a damage action. First, clear benefit is derived by the share-
holders of the target. An injunction would protect the Marathon shareholders
from making their decisions whether to sell without full information. As such, it
furthers the purpose of the Williams Act. Second, an injunctive action does not tip
the balance in favor of one tender offeror. This type of action serves merely to
prevent the manipulative practices at which the Williams Act was aimed without
deterring management or competing offerors from engaging in the battle.
Id. at 371-72.
177. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 38; Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76.
178. The congressional record for the Williams Act contains the following language:
"The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockhold-
ers while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to
fairly present their case." H.R. 17-11, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 854-55
(1967).
179. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text.
180. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 63-71 and
accompanying text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 63 & 71.
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the Mobil majority had followed those precedential cases, it
would not have gauged the effect of the relief sought by Mobil,
but would have rather concentrated on whether the statute
granted private rights to any class' 8 or whether the statute pro-
scribed any conduct as unlawful. 18 The Touche Ross and Tran-
samerica Courts held that absent these factors, no cause of ac-
tion could be implied.'" Section 14(e), however, does prohibit
manipulative practices in the sale of securities and inadequate
disclosure.18 In Mobil, USS, Inc. and Marathon did not provide
sufficient information on their agreements and options and also
conducted manipulative practices.186 Because these are articul-
able violations of section 14(e), the Mobil court, at this point,
should have asserted that Mobil's private cause of action is con-
sistent with the congressional intent to create causes of action as
interpreted in the Touche Ross and Transamerica cases.
Had the Mobil court adopted this line of reasoning, there
would have been no need to modify the first Cort factor as was
done.18 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Touche Ross indicated
that not all the Cort factors had to be given equal weight.'s
Thus, the majority could have relied primarily on the Touche
Ross and Transamerica rationales of stressing congressional
intent. 9
The Mobil majority's analysis of the third Cort factor, the
private remedy must be consistent with the legislative scheme,
also illustrates its reliance on the Stevens' dissent. To limit the
effect of Piper, the Mobil majority successfuly distinguished the
injunctive relief sought by Mobil from the damages sought in
Piper. As Stevens had done,1'" the majority astutely reasoned
182. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24; Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 576.
183. See supra note 182.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 9.
186. See supra notes 10-11 & 18-20 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
188. 442 U.S. at 575. The Supreme Court in Touche Ross wrote that "the court [in
Cort v. Ash] did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight." Id.
Indeed, Justice Stevens in the Piper dissent stated that the Cort decision did not
regard the "especial class" factor as essential. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S.
at 67 (Stevens J., dissenting).
189. See supra notes 59 & 69 and accompanying text.
190. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that tender offerors hold the necessary information to detect any
section 14(e) violations. 191 Keeping in mind the legislative pur-
pose of protecting shareholders, arming tender offerors with a
private cause of action is consistent with that purpose if tender
offerors can act quickly to enforce section 14(e) disclosure re-
quirements. The Mobil court's reasoning on this narrow issue
was supported by the facts: the Marathon shareholders were
neither fully apprised of the Marathon-USS, Inc. agreements,192
nor were they aware that those respective managements had vio-
lated the securities laws by their "lock-out" options.9 3 Had Mo-
bil not held a vested interest in the ultimate dispositions of
Marathon's assets, it would not have compelled, by court order,
the Marathon Board of Directors to make further disclosure of
the USS, Inc. merger. The potential result: the Marathon share-
holders might have made uninformed investment decisions. Any
such occurrence dramatically underscores the need for arming
tender offerors with private causes of action under section 14(e)
for injunctive relief.
The majority's claim that a tender offeror's injunctive ac-
tion may be the only means of assuring the target shareholders a
fully informed free choice appears extreme; it overlooks the
shareholders of Marathon Oil Co. as potential plaintiffs. The na-
ture of tender offer situations, however, shifts the analysis,
again, from the theoretical level to the practicalities at hand. For
shareholders to bring an injunctive action to enjoin their own
management from participating in manipulative practices and to
ensure adequate disclosure, they must first have sufficient
knowledge to identify any such practices or any inadequate dis-
closure. Second, they must have sufficient resources to bring a
suit. Third, they must overcome the logistics problems of coor-
dinating other shareholders. Thus, a well informed and zealous
tender offeror is probably better suited to sue for injunctive
relief.1l
191. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d at 372.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
193. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
194. See supra text accompanying note 92. Justice Stevens wrote in his Piper dis-
sent that:
[P]rotection of tender offerors is not only consistent with protection of sharehold-
ers. It is also indispensable to protecting shareholders. Individual shareholders
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VII. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co. revitalizes a remedy for tender offerors. 195 If
injunctive relief is sought, courts may circumvent the Supreme
Court's holding in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. which
barred a tender offeror's standing to sue for damages. The Sixth
Circuit joined district courts from three other circuits in over-
coming the Piper-inspired moratorium on allowing tender offer-
ors to bring private causes of action under the federal securities
laws. The Mobil decision also overcomes the Supreme Court's
recent trend restricting private causes of action in general.'"
Since, in many ways, granting tender offerors injunctive relief
does protect investors, this cause of action does not appear in-
consistent with the underlying purpose of the Williams Act of
protecting investors. The grant of such a remedy, however, may
indeed be tipping the scales in favor of the tender offeror in
takeover situations, a result clearly unintended by the Williams
Act. In view of the paradox thus presented, it is necessary that
the Supreme Court address the issue of whether tender offerors
should be entitled to injunctive relief.
Mark F. Liscio
often lack the capacity to litigate these cases effectively. Few indeed could afford
to pursue the course Chris-Craft has taken of hiring counsel with experience in
complex litigation of this kind to litigate through a preliminary injunction, discov-
ery, trial on liability, another trial on damages, three appeals to the Second Cir-
cuit, including an en banc, and three petitions to this Court. Thus, the most real-
istic deterrent to fraud on shareholders is a damages suit brought by the
opposition in the tender contest. Moreover, disallowing such suits creates an in-
centive to violate the Act in retaliation for violations by the other side. When no
effective judicial remedy is available, self-help is more attractive. Finally a dam-
ages remedy for the tender offeror is necessary for the protection of one particular
class of shareholders: those shareholders of target corporations who accept an ex-
change offer and thereby become shareholders of the tender offeror.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Humana, Inc. v. American
Medicorp., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc.
v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp.,
511 F. Supp. 294 (1981). For a discussion of Humana, see supra notes 100-11; for a
discussion of Weeks, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text; for a discussion of
Crane, see supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
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